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Can	greater	central	bank	accountability	defuse	the
conflict	between	the	Bundesverfassungsgericht	and
the	European	Central	Bank?
Germany’s	constitutional	court	recently	ruled	that	asset	purchases	conducted	by	the	European	Central
Bank	could	be	incompatible	with	the	German	constitution.	As	Sebastian	Diessner	explains,	the
subsequent	rift	has	prompted	calls	for	greater	accountability	in	ECB	decision-making,	potentially	with
representatives	from	Germany’s	central	bank,	the	Bundesbank,	being	obliged	to	explain	ECB
decisions	in	the	Bundestag.	He	writes	that	while	there	should	be	no	illusions	that	such	a	measure
could	defuse	the	conflict	entirely,	an	honest	debate	about	central	bank	accountability	in	Europe	is	long
overdue.
The	recent	ruling	of	the	German	federal	constitutional	court	(Bundesverfassungsgericht)	with	regard	to	asset
purchases	by	the	European	Central	Bank	(ECB)	has	stunned	even	seasoned	observers	of	European	affairs,
prompting	accusations	of	the	Court	going	rogue	and	declaring	war	on	the	supranational	central	bank	and	the	wider
European	project.	In	Germany’s	federal	parliament	(the	Bundestag),	the	decision	triggered	an	impassioned	debate
about	what	ought	to	happen	in	response.	Indeed,	many	–	including	German	finance	minister	Olaf	Scholz	–	hope
that	the	quarrel	will	ultimately	be	resolved	within	Germany’s	federal	republic	and	not	spill	over	into	a	European
Union	that	is	already	struggling	to	battle	the	fallout	from	the	Covid-19	pandemic.
One	way	to	do	so,	it	is	increasingly	being	suggested,	could	be	for	Germany’s	national	central	bank,	the
Bundesbank,	to	explain	and	defend	the	collective	decisions	of	the	ECB’s	governing	council	in	front	of	German	MPs
in	the	Bundestag.	Yet,	what	would	be	the	promises	and	pitfalls	of	such	an	approach?	Previous	academic	and
policy-oriented	research	on	central	bank	accountability	in	Europe	can	point	to	an	answer.	The	European	Central
Bank,	for	instance,	already	has	a	quarterly	Monetary	Dialogue	with	the	European	Parliament’s	Committee	on
Economic	and	Monetary	Affairs	(ECON)	and	it	also	responds	directly	to	written	questions	by	MEPs.
While	some	have	tended	to	see	the	Monetary	Dialogue	as	a	mere	talking	shop,	it	does	provide	useful	insights	into
parliamentary	scrutiny	of	monetary	policy	and	can	thus	offer	a	template	for	national	parliaments	of	how	to	hold
central	bankers	to	account.	Indeed,	the	ECON	Committee	has	proven	throughout	the	Eurozone	crisis	that	it	can	be
a	partner	to	be	reckoned	with.	Yet,	there	is	no	denying	that	the	ECB’s	accountability	could	and	should	be
strengthened	further,	as	highlighted	not	least	in	a	number	of	recent	policy	reports	(see	here	and	here).	For	the	most
part,	more	effective	scrutiny	of	monetary	policy-makers’	actions	hinges	on	the	focus	and	specialisation	of
parliamentarians,	and	on	the	willingness	of	central	bankers	to	engage	in	meaningful	exchange.
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What	is	important	to	note,	however,	is	that	more	substantive	forms	of	accountability	–	i.e.	those	that	go	beyond
mere	answerability	by	a	central	bank	and	enable	parliament	to	reward	or	punish	its	actions	–	inevitably	raise
questions	about	central	bank	independence.	This	has	condemned	central	bank	accountability	in	the	Eurozone	to
the	seemingly	meaningless	realm	of	proceduralism	in	the	past.	Yet,	despite	the	widespread	view	that	independence
and	accountability	are	“two	sides	of	the	same	coin”	in	theory,	this	is	only	true	to	a	certain	and	rather	limited	extent	in
practice.
In	the	current	context,	it	seems	impractical	for	the	ECB	to	make	regular	visits	to	all	19	national	Eurozone
parliaments,	even	though	it	undertook	ad	hoc	visits	to	selected	parliaments	after	the	Eurozone	crisis.	But	there	is	a
case	to	be	made	that	national	central	banks	be	heard	by	their	national	parliaments,	a	practice	that	currently	varies
widely	across	member	states.	It	is	crucial,	however,	that	a	closer	scrutiny	of	national	central	banks	does	not	lead	to
a	re-nationalisation	of	Eurozone	monetary	policy,	a	long-standing	concern	among	the	defenders	of	the	ECB’s
limited	accountability.
In	a	worst-case	scenario,	national	central	bank	governors	would	–	ahead	of	the	ECB	governing	council	meetings	at
which	monetary	policy	decisions	for	the	Eurozone	are	formulated	–	seek	“mandates”	from	their	respective	national
parliaments,	and	then	profess	that	their	“hands	are	tied”	to	national	interests.	We	are	familiar	with	such	dynamics
from	the	intergovernmental	decision-making	in	the	Eurogroup	of	finance	ministers.	And	we	are	equally	familiar	with
the	all	too	common	outcome:	slow,	incomplete,	and	lowest	common	denominator	decisions.	It	is	here	that	central
bank	independence	can	and	should	demonstrate	its	worth.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	implausible	to	assume	that	one
can	circumvent	national	political	dynamics	in	the	ECB	governing	council	altogether.	As	so	often,	the	dose	makes
the	poison.
What	is	truly	needed,	then,	is	a	careful	reflection	about	the	institutional	role	of	national	central	banks	(NCBs)	in	the
Eurozone.	NCBs	–	generously	staffed	with	skilled	personnel	–	collect	and	analyse	large	amounts	of	data,	maintain
payment	infrastructures,	and	execute	policy	decisions	made	by	the	ECB	governing	council.	Yet,	we	have	paid	too
little	attention	in	the	past	to	the	part	that	NCBs	might	play	in	shoring	up	trust	in	the	Eurosystem	and	ensuring	that
ECB	decisions	are	intelligible	and	acceptable	to	audiences	beyond	financial	markets,	namely	in	the	political	and
societal	sphere.	Will	national	central	banks	in	the	future	come	to	be	seen	as	translators	of	governing	council
decisions	to	different	national	audiences,	or	rather	as	defenders	of	national	interests	and	loudspeakers	for	political
disagreements?
A	final	vexing	issue	relates	to	the	notion	of	central	bank	transparency,	which	most	observers	agree	to	be	a	vital
prerequisite	for	being	able	to	hold	monetary	policy-makers	accountable	in	the	first	place.	Much	of	the	controversial
ruling	of	the	Bundesverfassungsgericht	indeed	appears	to	be	premised	on	the	notion	that	ECB	policies	have	not
been	documented	appropriately	in	the	past	and	are	therefore	next	to	impossible	to	scrutinise.	However,	it	is
important	to	bear	in	mind	that	even	the	noble	principle	of	transparency	has	its	limits.	As	the	European	Court	of
Justice	suggests	(precisely	in	the	ruling	on	the	ECB’s	Public	Sector	Purchase	Programme	dismissed	by	the
Bundesverfassungsgericht),	a	certain	degree	of	opaqueness	is	not	only	permissible	but	necessary	to	render	the
programme	compliant	with	the	often-cited	Article	123	TFEU	(the	so-called	prohibition	on	monetary	financing),
namely	in	order	to	ensure	uncertainty	over	which	bonds	will	be	purchased	by	the	central	bank	and	when.
On	the	whole,	a	sober	look	at	the	theory	and	practice	of	central	bank	accountability	thus	makes	it	clear	that	there
are	few	easy	answers	and	much	need	for	caution	when	designing	mechanisms	of	parliamentary	scrutiny	for	central
banks.	Those	hoping	for	ready-made	and	easy-to-implement	solutions	to	defuse	the	conflict	between	German
judges	and	European	monetary	policy-makers	should	not	hold	their	breath.	What	does	seem	clear,	however,	is	that
ECB	accountability	should	best	be	performed	and	strengthened	at	the	European	level,	while	increased
accountability	of	NCBs	in	national	parliaments	should	be	explored	further	with	the	above	caveats	in	mind.	An
honest	debate	about	central	bank	accountability	in	Europe	–	and	the	role	of	national	central	banks	therein	–	is
indeed	long	overdue,	beyond	the	acute	conflict	at	hand.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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